The radical and the conservative Liberals :Gladstone and the Whigs

The most consistent problem for Gladstone’s agenda in the Liberal party throughout Gladstone’s years of party leadership ( from 1867 to 1894 with six years of theoretical break after 1874) was the Whigs. Until 1886 this was because they were the leading opposition within the party-afterwards when the Whigs left over Home Rule (that is a nearly independent parliament for Ireland theirs and other liberals defection from the party placed the Liberals previous normal majority in severe danger.

The “Whigs" is a loose term for a faction that can be seen as the fairly lineal successor to the party that had provided ( it’s deeper roots in the early eighteenth century are much murkier arguably the “Whig” party of that era is just as much the ancestor of the Tory party). This party had been in favour of oligarchy and the exclusion of the monarchy from party politics and the control of the Royal Prerogative by ministers responsible to Parliament. It had opposed the rather haphazard constitutional settlement and pushed for the narrow but clearer franchise that prevailed after the “Great Reform Act”. It had supported a “widening” of the British constitution to include religious dissenters by holding them eligible for a wider selection of state positions from the bar to membership of Parliament. Generally they took an Erastian attitude to the Church of England that is an attitude that believed Parliament could order the Church of England and it’s property against the wishes of the Church’s officeholders-. They are often identified with a rather sceptical and cynical attitude to religion though it is probably rather easy to exaggerate that –and even some historians who accept that argue that by the late nineteenth century many were in fact pious Anglicans. They generally took a comparatively “reforming” which is to say classically liberal attitude “laissez-faire” attitude to the economy. Tories disagreed to varying degrees with these “progressive” ideas in the early nineteenth century.

Thus in the context of earlier in the century the Whigs had generally (they were never a monolith) stood for a distantly “reforming” or leftwing agenda . Gladstone as a Tory had been reared on wariness of the Whigs and his early high Tory calling for a sanctified state in many ways can be seen as a wholesale rejection of and attack on Whig ideology from the right. But by the late nineteenth century the differences between Gladstone as liberal and the Whigs had grown increasingly hard and relevant. At the same time the issues which had once separated Whig and Tory were now increasingly irrelevant to party politics.

In particular what had formed the core of Whig progressives was a desire to open up the establishment and centres of authority. But this was combined with a support. This even extended to what one might call a "typical" Whig view of marriage. ~The more aristocratic Whigs tended to take a relaxed view of marriage vows particularly after an heir had been secured. However they tended to be fairly hostile to divorce and were at best unenthusiastic about legislation to liberalise it. These attitudes can be seen in the attitude of their last great leader Lord Hartingdon (later Duke of Devonshire) a notorious womanizer who denounced Charles Stewart Parnell's divorce. While by this point he had reasons for taking a hypocritcal attitude I think actualy it was quite consistent with Hartingdon's general ideology to be relaxed about adultery but highly critical of divorce.Thus they had an overall theme- loosening or opening up established institutions was one thing- dismantling them another.

But Gladstone’s reforms went well beyond Whig open to a desire to dismantle these same establishments and centres of authority even to challenge the notions of oligarchy and property that were key to the Whig worldview . This challenged many values that were dear to Whigs; they nearly always supported the continuation of established churches the “hard case” of Ireland gained many rebels when Gladstone disestablished it- . Many of them feared Gladstone’s polices as excessively populist, deep in the worldview of the Whigs was a wariness of democracy and Gladstonians populist appeals and franchise extension stepped on it. Gladstone’s push for reform in the late 1860’s (in alliance with Russell the Whig leader) was stopped by a rebellion among Whigs and his push to extend the franchise in the 1880’s while more successful also was resisted. Increasingly their notions of property were, alienated by Gladstone’s reforms. The confiscation of some of the lands of the Church of Ireland aroused even more opposition that disestablishment itself and there was also great trouble about his land reforms of the early 1880’s. It was Home Rule that precipitated the more or less complete departure of the Whigs- but they departure had been long in coming.

Interestingly for all his “radicalism” Gladstone included an enormous number of Whigs in his cabinet- particularly Whig peers (Gladstone’s cabinet tended to be extremely Peer heavy). This is generally ascribed to snobbery to put it harshly or to a belief in aristocratic leadership to put it more positively. Others have emphasised the role of experience though that is a slightly circular argument. I would suggest part of the explanation was to tie leading moderates and members of the Lords which was always the more difficult house for liberal reforms). With them both rewarded by office and invested in the possibility of passage the actual passage of Cabinet legislation was much more likely .This of course meant Cabinet passage was more difficult -but in this Gladstone’s force of personality could play a key role. It’s worth noting that it was after the departure of the Whigs in 1886 over Home Rule that Gladstone’s governments major policy initiatives dried up-it was a lot harder to win elections and even harder when in government to get polices through the Lords . Given this I feel that rational political calculation in Gladstone’s cabinet composition has I feel been a bit neglected.

It should also be noted that Whigs properly speaking were not the only politicians to give Gladstone’s problems from the right. Many who at least originally were not regarded as on the right moved there or were alienated by Gladstone’s further radicalism?.This was to reach it’s culmination in home rule but there were examples beforehand. The classic case was Goschen. A key and rather radical member of Gladstone’s first ministry his ardent nationalism and unbending commitment to laissez-faire moved away from Gladstone even before Home Rule he had opposed regulations of employers and franchise extension (he thought te latter would lead to confiscation of property) . Shortly after his break to Gladstone he was described on Ireland by Lord Salisbury’s niece as “more Tory than uncle Robert”.

Even after the departure of the Whigs and many others there remained something of a rightwing to the liberals including Lord Roseberry himself a man with some Whig tendencies. The “liberal imperialists” were already influential and there was a greater support for military spending than Gladstone found acceptable. It was to be over military spending after all that Gladstone formerly resigned from government for good.

This is a picture of Lord Hartington latter eight Duke of Devonshire of one of hte oldest and richest families in England. He was the leader of the Whigs and a good enough liberal to actualy serve as leader during Gladstone's hiratus. And yet after his departure over Home Rule in 1886 he was to be not just an ally of the Conservatives-but an opponent of those few “progressive” reforms Conservatives could support

“Fructify in the pockets of the people “Gladstone as Chancellor

In the previous series of posts we have looked at Gladstone’s political thought from his pragmaticism to his opposition to government spending. Now we are to look at some of his actions. In particular we are to look at his hugely important tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

There has been a lot of focus on Gladstone as prime Minister. His chancellorship is I’d say much less known. And it was in this period that he fundamentally moved to “liberal” viewpoint and left behind fully his High Tory past. It’s his tenure as one of Britain’s most important Chancellors ever that he forged the power that made him Prime Minister he would never have become Prime Minister.
He was probably the most important single chancellor of the nineteenth century. This can be seen in a number of ways.

Firstly he simply changed the economic and fiscal policy of the United Kingdom the world’s preeminent economic power. Partly this was through the constant application of “economy” and expenditure control. Gladstone’s accession to the Chancellorship marks a halt for several decades of what was otherwise a continuous century’s long increase in regular expenditure and borrowing. In a sense Gladstone’s chancellorship and its imitators (of both parties) managed to halt Gladstone managed to apply rigorous expenditure control. This was combined with a switch away from direct taxation (such as income tax) –though Gladstone’s economy measures were enough that he still cut the income tax in several budgets in the 60’s having previously raised it. It was in indirect taxation that there was a sharp downward trend. Perhaps the most significant single tax change was the abolition of Paper duties which helped spark a massive boom in the British (particularly the provincial) press.

Nor was strict fiscal policy the only area where Gladstone had an enormous effect on direct policy. He also was possibly the prime force in the Anglo-Franco trading treaty. This saw mutual reduciaons in tariffs by both Britain and France. yet
Britain was seen then (and since) as the epitome of free trade ideology and France as a relatively and somewhat ideologically Protectionist state. The cynic might say that it was inevitable that the fiscal reality was that Britain’s real tariffs were higher against France’s than vice versa –because their restrictions on wine were on a major import while France’s tariffs were overwhelmingly on relatively minor imports . Gladstone used the treaty to push down trade barriers. But it also represented an early version of his “Cobdonite” international vision whereby trade and international agreement could replace military force and empire ( much more enthusiasm of the great Liberal though barely liberal statesman Palmerston who was Prime Minister for much of this period). It did indeed spark a whole series of multilateral trading treaties-though ironically some argue that in turn helped inaugurate the end of the free trade era.

From a longer perspective the modern Treasury was also in large part the product of Gladstone’s Chancellorship. The institutional obsession with a balanced budget and low spending that lasted well into the twentieth century (and many would argue well beyond) owed a great deal to the powerful ethos of Gladstone. Similarly The modern Chancellor’s budget – in it’s use as the single seminal moment of the fiscal year ( which has started breaking down in recent years) is in many ways the product of Gladstone’s desire both to control the whole fiscal operations of government as a cohesive whole and his public showmanship. Finally dominance of the treasury among departments and control over spending dates in it’s fullness from this period.

One reason why Gladstone was able to have such massive and lasting policy and institutional effects as Chancellor was his huge political success. His economic agenda was genuinely popular. IT’s worth remembering that taxation was regressive in this period and very little expenditure whet on welfare (and that which did was mostly the poor law whose recipients were disenfranchised). Gladstone’s reforms represented a direct rise in the real incomes of virtually all voters and most adults-and were rewarded at the polls. Similarly the burden of debt through taxation (from the Napoleonic war) had caused strain for decades so minimising it was cherished. There was a widespread political demand to keep taxation and debt low.

What was at least in part new was that Gladstone achieved enormous political dividends through the assurance that he would actually deliver on such demands.
Partly for this reason his chancellorship also saw the liberal party change from a coalition of somewhat free trade groups to a party (it was coalescing in this period) where free trade was a supreme dogma. Free trade sentiment even experienced a strong pull on the Conservatives – though they had more or less abandoned protection towards the early 1850’s just before. However it was though the fiscal, political and perceived economic success of Gladstone’s chancellorship that a very strong consensus was forged across the parties on the permanence of free trade-the elections of the 1840's had contrary to myth been far from unambiguous on the subject. This consensus was not to be shaken till the 1880's , not to be broken till the 1900's and not to lead to the formal abandonment of free trade till the 1930's and the National Government inaugurated a new era of “preferential trade” that lasts till this day. Gladstone did not only increase free trade directly but indirectly through building a new fiscal architecture with free trade as a fundamental building block.

The popularity of Gladstone’s record also made him a huge popular and public figure in a way he had not been before. He nurtured this through the provincial press. This was strongly sympathetic to him-partly because his abolition of paper duty had been of such economic benefit to them and partly because of it’s ideology-it was mostly strongly liberal in a rather “Gladstonian” way. There was also of course a role for great national papers including the new rising star of the media firmament-the Telegraph. Gladstone gave a large number of speeches in this era including in the provinces. These were extensively reported by the press and in combination with his record built up a huge political following.

It was this following that was to make him Prime Minister. It was because of this that when Russell retired in 1866 Gladstone was the inevitable successor. This was not because of his support among the Parliamentarians of the Liberals , among whom he was respected but also regarded as eccentric and increasingly as excessively radical. It was because his public profile and support was so much higher with Russell gone than any other liberal mp that he was the inevitable candidate.
Thus for a whole number of reasons Gladstone has to be regarded as a monumentally important Chancellor up there , David Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain and Gordon Brown. Indeed he arguably exceeds them all in importance.

This is a picture of Number 11 downing Street- the residence of the office-the Chancellor of the Exchequer which owes so much of its modern importance to Gladstone.

A Partial Democrat- William Gladstone and the Franchise

In this exploration of Gladstone’s attitudes we now turn to his attitude to the extension of the Franchise one of the leading questions of the late nineteenth century era he dominated. He played an important part in the 1867 reform bill (though it seems it was actually more radical than he wanted) and the extension of 1885 to the counties. These reforms between them represented the creation of a working class majority in British politics that was to last till the last decades of the twentieth century.

To some degree the same attitudes that shaped Gladstone’s laissez-faire economics or disestablishmentarianism on religious policy also affected his attitude to the Franchise. The dislike of privilege and belief in a free society with adults interacting on equal terms could be extended to politics such as the privileges of the unelected ( the House of Lords) or limitations in the Franchise. Gladstone also increasingly came of the view the will of the masses represented a moral imperative different in type but somewhat similar in nature to his earlier belief in the state being the political representation of the church- the masses could be some substitute for his earlier vision of the church in the state . However he was cautious in his support never proposing full universal suffrage.

Partly that represented his usual desire to make sure there was a short or medium term opportunity for legislation. IT also represented the difficulty in taking an absolute attitude to the Franchise – particularly in a country which possessed (however reluctantly in Gladstone’s case)a vast empire. It also represented his desire both to have a movement behind a proposed change and . There may also have been social aspects he was a very strong supporter of separate roles for women and the “duty” of the aristocracy- though his belief in aristocratic noblisse oblige did not necessarily mean a defence of aristocratic privilege though he tended to be strongly biased in favour of appointing the to his cabinets. Perhaps most important was his belief that to wield such power the electorate must be responsible –thus he tended to talk about a “stake in society” – homeowners or lone term tenants rather than just all adults or even all males.

Several of these are illustrated in the cases of female suffrage. Gladstone is sometimes spoken of as a strong opponent. In fact he was not a clear cut opponent. This is particularly remarkable given his generation-he was part of the generation of the Great Reform (which formally banned women fully from the franchise for the first time). However Gladstone did have a number of objections he was worried that would it would reduce the distinction between women and men. He may also have been reasonably worried that enfranchising women particularly on a property basis would help the Conservatives -the conservative’s most reactionary leader of the era Lord Salisbury supported enfranchising women for exactly this reason. However his strongest objection was probably that only a group of voters who overwhelmingly demanded to be enfranchised should be. In t he 1890’s there was a rather formidable nascent strong female anti suffrage as well as a pro suffrage movement. For Gladstone there as the lack of a “moral force” in the sense of public pressure rallied around principle.

Thus while on the liberal side of the political spectrum of the era Gladstone’s attitude to Franchise extension was highly pragmatic.

Here is a caricature of Robert Lowe- one of the foremost opponents of Gladstone's push to extend the Franchise.

Partial Laissez-Faire: Absolute Economy: the Political Thought of William Gladstone

We now turn to discussing the economc thought of that greatest of Victorian Statesman William Gladstone . He was in broad measure a “political economist” in the lingo of his era that is a believer in “Laissez-faire” or limited government intervention in the economy-government existing solely to provide a framework of law enforcement. This was particular true in terms of opposing government borrowing. However what were the sources of Gladstone’s beliefs- and their precise nature?

As already stated Gladstone’s religious views did a great deal to influence his political views on nationalism and church government. This was broadly true of his views on political economy as well as.. He believed in a vision of a moral society and believed low regulation low taxatyion and low expenditure would create one.

In this he was hugely influenced by his great mentor Robert Peel. Peel had developed and influenced Gladstone int he notion that removing commercial restrictions ,distortions of taxation and high expenditure could not only promote prosperity but also promote good character. Laissez-Faire is often caricatured as a system of thought which ignores ethical issues and is based on a amoral view of economic transaction, and a “if it feels good do it” ethos. For Peel and Gladstone as for so many Victorian advocates of Laissez-Faire this could not have been further from the truth.

For them it was to promote morality particularly those parts of morality most linked to discipline-such as thrift and self-reliance. They believed that by abolishing special “privileges” such as the Corn laws or by keeping welfare payments in the form of the Poor Law down they would promote a more moral society where people succeeded through their own efforts or through the charity of others (Gladstone was an enthusiastic philanthropist himself) . They also believed this would lead to a more prosperous society but it is important to believe they saw it as achieving both. This is often seen as an expression of Victorian evangelicalism but It’s worth remembering that while Peel was arguably evangelical Gladstone’s own moral ethos was formed in an Anglo-Catholicism which saw the evangelical culture as insufficiently committed to moral discipline.

Arguably even more important in his own thought was Gladstone’s strong attachment to absolute rules which could be applied universally and rigidly. This arguably represented his education and the philosophy he absorbed when young-in a sense a reflection of the latter Enlightenment particularly in the British Isles. It also seems to have fitted in way his ideas of justice and the notion of equality before he law that was central to the liberalism he embraced. Just as the state should not make distinctions between religions) so it should not make distinctions on economics.

On economics he was fundamentally Laissez-faire. But it’s important to note that this was much more true in some respects than others.

One area this took the form was his absolute insistence on balancing the budget above all else-including raising taxes to do so. Gladstone believed even in wars taxation not borrowing should pay for spending. This I think clearly reflects both a desire to eliminate limits to spending and the degree to which his belief in “economy” was founded in a form of moral values like responsibility- avoiding the consequences of spending was immoral.

Secondly he was much more hostile to government expenditure than government regulation. IN some fields of regulation such as of sexual behavoiur such as sex by the under sixteens he was if anything unusually enthusiastic for regulation. Even in more purely “economic” regulation such as that of the railways he was often more supportive than the average opinion of the time. One major piece of legislation passed by his government in the 1890’s (it was eviscerated by the House of lords only for the Tories to pass a more extensive one) was a bill to force employers to pay compensation to injured employees. Perhaps most significant of all was his reforms of Irish land reform achieved by his government in the early 1880’s. This by giving tenants in Ireland certain rights of possession and to compensation for deterance was arguably the greatest attack on private property rights by the British government for centuries. This should not be exaggerated Gladstone even in old age was naturally sceptical of most regulation. For example his favoured solution to the problem of alcohol abuse was to reduce taxes on wine imports which he believed would lead to more civilised drinking habits than hard spirits-he was a drag on his party’s support of a more restrictive alcohol regime.

But his attitude on spending was much more rigid. While Gladstone’s decades of influence (till the last decade or saw) saw a temporary freeze in the previous constant rise in government spending and taxation totals he still saw spending as far too high. In His first (1868-1874) ministry Robert Lowe one of the most tight fisted Chancellors in UK history was pushed out by Gladstone for spending too much. Similarly he was proud in reducing by hundreds of thousands and was a fervent opponent of Defence Spending. IN fact the fact defence spending was so large a part of government expenditure (and particularly sudden rises in expenditure) probably does a lot to explain his fairly pacific foreign policies. He finally resigned the premiership in 1894 against an increase in government expenditure on defence.
It is typical of the contrasting attitudes of Gladstone on “economy” vs government spending that his Irish reforms did not involve providing money for tenants to purchase their freeholder. That was done by Lord Salisbury’s government of the late 1880’s. Salisbury was in virtually all respects more supportive of the rights of property than Gladstone. But he was also less fanatical on the issue of Economy. Or to put it another way on matters of regulation Gladstone was probably as regulatory as the average Victorian (which is to say not much). On matters of expenditure and borrowing he was even by Victorian standards a fanatical supporter of Laissez-faire.

What explains these differences in Gladstone’s attitudes to Laissez-Faire? I would suggest partly it was ministerial experience. Gladstone rose from a major minister to the leading political figure in the country was essentially on the back of his experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer-thus he developed an obsession with low expenditure and balanced budgets.this is partly because being measured in terms of money it’s quantifiable - today its not obvious how to “quantify” the restrictions imposed by regulations and that was of course vastly more true then . Also by paying for costs and making people pay as far as possible for their own costs Gladstone’s fundamental belief in responsibility and character development through struggle could drive his fiscal policy in essentially all circumstances (even on military matters his disdain for military culture could feed it) . On matters such as alcohol or the duties of employers and landowners the belief that responsibility could only be enforced by law had more weight.

This is a picture of Robert Peel the Great Prime minister who did so much to shape Gladstone’s views of the proper role of a minister and the proper role of the state.

Anglo Catholic for Secularism: Religion and William Gladstone's Church Policy

Nationalism was not the only way Gladstone’s religous views led to radicalism. Another was in the matter of Church establishment. This was an enormous issue in late in nineteenth century British politics. Only a minoiryt of churchgoers attended the established churches but they had a full staple of links to the state and legal privileges including tithes(that is taxes paid to clergy of the established church). At a time when sectarian alignment was perhaps the biggest dividing line socially these links were fiercely resented and defended . Radical cries of “free church” and conservative of “church in danger” were the staples of election campaigns. As the narrow foundations of a welfare state in education were laid from the 1870's onwardsthe funding of this also became a huge issue-particularly as religious schools were nearly all Anglican or belonged to the unpopular Catholic minority.

As mentioned in a previous post in his youth Gladstone believed the state needed to be the political expression of the state. He soon cast this aside as impractical. In it’s place developed an opposition to the merger of Church and state (albeit one subject to caution and pragmaticism) . This was based in large part on the very absolutism of his religous views. Gladstone believed that such measures as the legalisation of divorce and remarriage involved the state rejecting it’s Christian identity. Thus drawing further arbitrary (in his view) lines was merely a form of tyranny. It was in large measure for that reason he risked a great deal of criticism by supporting the case of Charles Brandlaugh who as a freethinker refused to swear an oath to god to sit in Parliament and clashed viciously with Lord Randolph Churchill on this issue.

AT the same time the compromises involved in the practical politics risked in his view corrupting distinctive Anglican doctrines. In the 1870’s education funding became significant and rapidly became the subject of sectarian and religious controversy over what schools should be funded and what religious education should be provided . Gladstone tended to the most hard core “secularist” position no funding for religious education by the government at all. Nearly all the other advocates of this support were hostile or indifferent to religion or militant anti Anglican Nonconformists. Nonconformists lacked schools of their own –though most of them unlike Gladstone were supportive of “non denominational” bible teaching. Gladstone’s logic was very different then he was against “non denominational” teaching because he believed it would miss the most important religious teaching and he was against funding of religious schools because he believed that would determine content. Gladstone’s fussy Anglicanism led him to oppose any government support of the Anglican church. This was a very rare combination of cause and motive! Though in a deeper sense it was arguably typical the opponents of establishment feared the combination of state and religion usually because they saw it as a threat to their own religious convictions.

It should be noted this was not just a form of fussy Anglicanism. In a sense Gladstone’s Anglo-Catholic tendencies were partly responsible for his disestablishmentarianism as well as the sectional Anglicanism linked to it. The more the state was involved with the church or church schools the more control nonconformist had over it- with their virulently protestant view (and to a much lesser extent sceptics and rationalists). Similarly Priests tended to much more supportive of Anglo-Catholicism than devout laity unsuprinsgly perhaps given the emphasis Anglo Catholicism lays on the role of the Priest ( as one sign Anglo-Catholic Churches generally got lower attendance than the Evangelical) . The Establishment of the church and government funding of education gave more power to lay members of the Church of England as compared to the clergy. Gladstone both saw this as a diminishing of the proper role of the Clergy and as a threat to his preferred theology .

This was certainly a legitimate fear. AS late as the 1920’s Anglo Catholics now the most powerful force in the church hierarchy pushed a new more Catholic addition to the Prayer book –only to see it beaten in the House of Commons after enormous opposition from “low church” Anglicans and nonconformists alike . Within the Church of England evangelicals were the strongest supporters of establishment for exactly these reasons well into the twentieth century. Ironically they often had extremely similar personal theology to nonconformists who were among the most fervent opponents-in large part because they saw establishment as the government blessing of "catholic"practices and beliefs.

IN Gladstone’s own lifetime “anti-ritualist” laws to curb the more extreme anglo catholic ceremonies were a staple of late nineteenth century British politics. Perhaps the most extreme moment was under Disraeli Gladstone’s arch rival whose hatred of “rits and rats” (ritualists/ Anglo-Catholics and rationalists- those who called for a less supernatural Christianity ) led to them being excluded from appointment as bishops(and the appointment of lots of evangelicals. Similarly Gladstone’s new embrace of “free church” seems to have owed something to the Gorham judgement which in the early 1850’s ruled that clergy of the Church of England could deny baptismal regeneration if they saw fit (the doctrine that baptism in itself supernaturally wipes away sin in infants). Thus Anglo-Catholicism as well as nervous Anglicanism contributed a great deal to Gladstone’s wariness of the union of Throne and Altar that was at the heart of the UK right as with just about every other western state of the era.

National issues and church policy broadly defined are not the only ways in which Gladstone’s politics was affected by his religion though they are probably the preeminent. In the relatively narrow area of sexual morality he tended to champion restrictive laws and in old age bemoaned he could not lead a crusade against contraception-though religious differences on such matters were relatively minor in his lifetime. He had a deep belief in the importance of character formation and responsibility that partly lay behind his belief in “economy” and h is vision of economics as discussed in the next post. He believed very much in the need for morality backed by religious sentiment to determine political action- in many ways his socio-economic vision as we will see in the next post was heavily driven by belief in the importance of character, general rigid and clear rules and the need to have ethical themes run through society. His emphasis on peace in foreign affairs may also have held some religious roots.

This is a picture of Gorham the priest whose survival in the church of England (thanks to courts) while denying the key catholic doctrine of baptismal regeneration so angered Gladstone.

From Bishops to Bulgaria:Religion and Nation in the Thought of William Gladstone

So how did Gladstone’s “Puseyite” Anglo-Catholic views lead Gladstone (unlike so many other “Puseyites” to the “left” of his day? I should add another reason why religion was once underplayed as a factor in Gladstone’s decision making is that because most of his supporters had very different religious views (indeed the majority were “nonconformists” Protestants who found the Church of England too Protestant not to Catholic) and partly because of a certain basic secularism to public debate (indeed the Sectarian diversity of the UK then was a major cause of that) Gladstone was very careful in public in expressing the religious motivations of his policies.

One way it did so was by the way in which it developed is support of nationalism and the form it took. For Gladstone this was based in his theory of the church which saw the Christian church as divided into national institutions of a universal Catholic Church-and individual institutional churches that were the creation of divine will (unlike the evangelical/Protestant view) but were also independent and equal (unlike the Roman Catholic theory of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff). AT the same time they were part of one general body Over time this led Gladstone to embrace nationalism and internationalism two of the great liberal causes of the nineteenth century-but for very unusual reasons. His belief in the spiritual reality of national churches led to a belief in real nations which he saw as fundamentally the expression of such a nation.

In terms of British politics the most radical manifestation of this was to be Home Rule for Ireland that is the repeal of the Union and the creation of a much looser relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom- a view he only saw as “ripe” and correct after years of battling against Home Rulers –when he became convinced Ireland was indeed naturally a nation. It also rendered him highly sympathetic to national movements in Europe (and a foe of the Roman Catholic Church on almost all such issues unlike Ireland). Another flip side of this was his deep scepticism about imperialism which clashed with the growing support for the British empire in the nineteenth century. There is evidence that by the end of his career he was more or less opposed to the British Empire. At the very least he was an extreme sceptic of any strong measures to expand it including a virulent opponent of military spending (which also reflected his support for economy) and opposed efforts in the 1880’s to expand the British empire.

Nowadays “anti-imperialism” put as such seems at the very least such an uncontroversial cause that it is hard to see how Gladstone’s position invoked such strong negative emotions and led to such tensions even within his own party. It’s worth remembering the empire was the field in which the UK was involved in international power politics, carried out any form of “civilising” mission, using force to protect British interest, preventing French or German international dominance and so forth. In a sense the empire was the equivalent of NATO , military action and political intervention and overas abroad today- and thus Gladstone’s deep scepticism was extremely unpopular with the political class and controversial at least with the public. There was a reason why Gladstonian radicals were often called “little Englanders”. It also helps explain Gladstone's enormous popularity abroad -he was the voice agianst the assertion of the Power of the world's mightest country (for example when the US sought reparations from the UK over confederate shipping based in the UK)

These kind of sentiments lay in large measure behind his campaign in the 1870's agianst “Bulgarian atrocities” the notion of supporting supposed Turkish oppression of an independent nation infuriated him-and the Tory argument that the Ottoman empire was necessary to protect the British had little resonance with Gladstone . IN this case simple Christian sectarianism may also have played a role – and it may be relevant Gladstone more than most Englishman identified with Christianity in general much more than Protestantism- and the Bulgarians were Christians if not Protestants.
The flip side of his religious motivation was that nations should also have a harmonious relationship like (ideally) the different national churches. This does a great deal to explain Gladstone’s enthusiasm for international law and for multilateral trade agreements for example the Anglo-Franco trading treaty. He was a believer in a “Cobdonite” theory that a network of trade could be set up building a commonwealth of sovereign nations united in harm-but the values that underlay his vision were very different.

Some of what one might see as Gladstone’s eccentricities in his policy also owed a great deal to these religious roots. One was his absolute failure to compromise on including Ulster in a home Rule Ireland an incredibly unpopular and potentially civil war causing position. This owed a good dela to pressure from his Irish nationalist allies but arguably even more to his simple belif (partly rooted in Church government) that Ulster was part of the Irish nation –regardless of the majority of Ulsterman’s views which he ascribed to religious bigotry. His fairly strong Confederate (unusual in a British liberal though not necessarily their American counterparts) sympathies during the war itself arguably reflect to some degree his Liverpool and pro slavery background. But they probably eve more reflect his view that once one had “made a nation” then that nation’s rights should be respected.

He is a picture of Gladstone speaking against the Bulgarian atrocities just one of his many “secular” campaigns that had deep religious roots.

Here is a picture of the Same Cobdon whose views on foreign policy were so similar (if less pragmatic) as Gladstone's -but for very different reasons.

"Pusey in a Blue Coat" : The religious views of William Gladstone

Gladstone Religion
IN our exploration of Gladstone the Victorian Titan we now turn to perhaps the most important source of his political views- the way in which his religious views shaped the views of the latter Gladstone the “Grand Old Man”.

This was absolutely central to Gladstone’s political thought as is very well shown by Matthew’s work and more generally in Gladstonian scholarship. This can be seen partly as a significant part of the rediscovery of the central role of religion in the Victoria era. IT also reflects the expansion of scholarshi8p on Gladstone-and access to Gladstone’s own papers and Diary. It’s also represents the slow overcoming of the negative legacy of his official biographer.

His official biographer was John Morley one of Gladstone’s closest political allies. IN terms of the role of religion however he was badly chosen. For while Morley’s politics were close to Gladstone’s own his religious views as a “freethinker” (that is an opponent of the claims of organised religion) could scarcely be more different. Unsurprisingly he did not do their central role of the latter in the former justice.

IN order to access the effect of these it is necessary first of all to establish the nature of these views. The mature Gladstone was not an evangelical it needs to be strongly emphasised. He had it is true come from an evangelical background particularly his devout mother. Several of the Gladstone children moved far away from this theology. One Robertson at one point Mayor of Liverpool become I think a Unitariain that is a denier of the Trinity the central doctrine shared by Catholics and Protestants alike . Another the possibly mentally unstable Helen became a Roman Catholic at one point using some works of Anglican divines as toilet paper.

William Gladstone moved less far but still far from his background. HE was an early enthusiast for the “oxford movement” that is the revival of Catholicism within the Church of England. This was to take him far from central evangelical themes such as the sufficiency of scripture and faith alone as the road to salvation. Despite this many seem today under the impression he was an evangelical. The writer had one conversation with a well informed historian (albeit not of this era) who was sure he was a nonconformist (that is a Protestant non Anglican) .

Many commentators have empathised supposed evangelical roots of his character and thought often in the teeth of the evidence in way that’s hard not to ascribe to prejudice or ignorance . One common one is the supposed evangelical roots of his emphasis on moral discipline and mortification. In Fact Gladstone like much of the early Oxford movement (the same was true of John latter Cardinal) Newman was partly attracted to it because he saw evangelicalism particularly with it’s emphasis on salvation through faith and a single moment of decision as insufficiently committed to the development of moral discipline and character.

They thus joined the growing “Catholic” element in the Church of England-one that was less Protestant and closer to the Church of Rome than any salient faction had been in the established churches of the British Isles for centuries the movement initially known as the “oxford movement” ( the university where it had arose in the 1830’s) has often become known as Anglo-Catholicism . IT was to develop into a broad group including those who agreed with the Roman Church doctrine on virtually every issue (even to the extent of denouncing many catholic priests as too Protestant) as well as those who had various problems with “catholic” doctrine whether the traditional Protestant objections or others.

So what was Gladstone’s personal version of Christianity? He was called by John Keble's the movement's founder “Pusey in a blue coat” –Pusey was one of the founders of the Oxford Movement one who left Protestant doctrines behind but remained Clearly distant from the Church of Rome. So for example he donated money (to the furry of some of the “higher” or more Catholic members of the Oxford Movement ) and rejected the official Roman Catholic understanding of Papal authority. This is quite a good way of understanding Gladstone’s theological views which were both Catholic and a long way from Rome.

On the one hand he was very clearly not a traditional Protestant. He believed for example that the communion service had a real effect in causing salvation, he emphasised a Priesthood ordained by bishops as central to the full Christian faith and saw the church in institutional and historic terms marked by these marks. That is in direct contradiction is contrary to the evangelical (and with some ifs and but the more broadly protestant insofar as it was separate) conception of the church as a union of believers. Gladstone’s belief in the Church as an institutional body with different national parts and compositions (and including Roman Catholics) was to be central to his politics. It was also bitterly controversial seen as heretical at a time when such things still mattered for politics. Gladstone was for eighteen years the mp for Oxford University (graduate of the universities had constituencies of their own untill the Atlee government). His deposition as mp for their, was significantly to the candidate of the “low church and anti-Puseyite party”.

On the other hand he was no Roman Catholic. Many Catholic doctrines he opposed even with abhorrence including their beliefs on the Virgin Mary. He was happy with the Book of Common Prayer (The Anglican liturgy) inherited from the Reformation and unlike many “Anglo Catholics” saw no reason to change it. Most significantly of all he saw the Pope as the foremost bishop of Christendom. The declaration of “Papal Infallibility” by the Vatican Council (though a more nuanced doctrine than the name suggests ) in 1870 sparked of a virulent polemic against it from Gladstone. This distance from Rome is perhaps significant though for complex reasons most British Catholic voters inclined overall to the left most English Catholic intellectuals were not on the left- and they certainly were rarely Gladstonian progressives.
Nonetheless it should be noted that Anglo Catholics including those with distance from Rome were rarely “Gladstonian” either, indeed they tended to be strongly conservative (though some were early Socialists). Indeed Gladstone himself when early an Anglo Catholic had been a “stern and unbending” Tory. Lord Salisbury had unsually close theology indeed it's important for the history of the Church of England that two such powerfull politicans were so sympathetic to the "ritualists" whom there was huge popular and lay pressure to expel from the Chruch of England).But Salisbruyt had very different political views from Gladstone So it is to the way he developing a “liberal” politics on the basis of his religious convictions to which we will now turn.

The picture above is of the same Pusey whose theology so closed matched Gladstone's

Gladstone: Pragmatism and Changeability

Having given a bird’s eyes view of his massive political impact and striking personality of Gladstone we now turn to examine his ideological world view. IT is worth noting in this context that there is a great degree of scholarship on William Gladstone of which my knowledge is rather sketchy. Perhaps my most important guiding light has been Matthew perhaps the greatest Gladstone scholar ever (sadly he died before writing a full biography) though several other writers among them Shannon and Boyd Hilton have shaped my views. I do not fill ;that confident my views so those who know about Gladstone do explain where I’m wrong or where addition gives a better picture!
It is worth noting that many of his political enemies and some of his closest political allies for example his deputy i the Commons William Harcourt saw him as constantly or often disingenuous and/or unprincipled. This contributed to the strong liberal's commen "I don't object to Gladstone always having the ace of trumps up his sleeve, but merely to his belief that the Almighty put it there."This goes against the beliefs of the great majority of historians and this author but there are several reasons why this was held against and believed of Gladstone.

Partly of course it was the usual pragmatism that is endemic to practical politicians combined with a deep refusal to acknowledge them. So for example Matthew suggests that his scepticism of votes for women owed a great deal to the very possibly they would vote for women (since women who owned or rented a home tended to be from much more affluent families than men) but one cannot find a quotation to back up this very plausible theory.

In this Gladstone was the opposite of Salisbury a man probably equally (which is to say highly) principled but a politician who frequently used “party opinion” to block progressive measures –in many cases this was almost certainly based on his own objections as much or more so than any supposed electoral backlash. Salisbury and Gladstone were diametric opposites in this on pretended to be less principled/ doctrinaire, the other more than they really were.

There was however a way in which Gladstone acknowledged Pragmatic considerations at least after the 1840’s where he first achieved high level government experience That was his emphasis on Statecraft and particularly the need for a statesman to deal only with the the issue of immediate legislation and/or governmental action -that is he did not believe in setting up vague general future aspirations- only ones that could be dealt by legislation soon”.This was very unlike his great ally and enemy Joe Chamberlain who was almost the opposite-the master of the extreme comment and the comparatively moderate policy.

This both integrates a certain pragamsticism in the teeth of politicians and the electorate and meant this this most ideological of Victorian Prime ministers put clear limit on his ideological statements. This pragmatisicm could be said to have parallels among great reforming Prime Ministers (Reform does not have to be a good idea!) whether Thatcher , Attlee or Asquith . It is probably no coincidence virtually all of them also left intact policies left they hated. They were both pragmatic enough to avoid issues which they regarded as excessively dangerous (disestablishment of the Church of Scotland being an example for Gladstone) and on the other ideologically motivated enough to actually achieve major reforms in the teeth of intense opposition.

Finally perhaps the biggest cause of Gladstone’s occasional reputation for being shifty was that he simply changed his mind a great deal not constantly but in great (nearly always permanent) shifts on a position.

IN his youth when he entered Parliament in the 1830's he was not just a member of the conservative party (This was an era of fairly weak party ties after all) but the “rising hope of the stern unbending Tories” in the name of the Whig Maccalay (a man whose politics were mch more conservative than the latter Gladstone. . At that point he certainly was not a “political economist” that is a supporter of laissre-faire or of “liberal” nationalist forces internationally. His biggest interests was in religion and the state –he horrified the conservative leadership particularly Robert Peel the then leader by the degree to which he sought to link the Church of England and the state- backing with his usual ferocious logic the exclusion of non Anglicans from the political world. This was set out in his first major work "The State in it's Relations with the Church".

Indeed the backlash by many against the book including his hero Peel seems to have been a major reason behind his latter refusal to write generally on political philosophy . This was at least in terms of policy- as said in the previous post Gladstone was to be the man who rolled back so many of such. So were large aspects- the man who was to become the exponent of lassire-faire in markets was the same man who gave his maiden speech in the Commons against the abolition of the slave trade (his father and native city Liverpool were both massively involved in the slave trade). AS we shall see many of his earlier views in particular the religous helped shape his latter views. However the evolution of his thought occurred in a series of stages culminating in major shifts often accompanied by personal crisis from the 1840’s onwards . The last truly major shift was on Home Rule in 1886 previously a fringe opinion among the non Irish. Gladstone’s often very sudden change in position often bewildered and infuriated those who had previously been supportive and gave him something of his reputation with his foes for both fanaticism and unreliability. Thus enormous loyalty could turn to huge resentment. The Duke of Norfolk rather paradoxically as both England’s most senior aristocrat and something of an outsider as a Roman Catholic. His love of Gladstone’s policies was so passionate he kept a Portrait on the wall of his mansion. When Gladstone endorsed Home Rule Norfolk sold the Portrait!

In conclusion Gladstone’s contemporary reputation for trickery was not composed of pure whole cloth. It was based in large measure on his failure to come to grips with his own political calculations emphasised specific legislation and changed his mind over the course of his sixty year political career. This did not mean that the mature Gladstone of the 1860’s and 1870’s did not have a finely worked political ideologynow.It is now to the political thought of him as a liberal that we will now turn

Here on the other hand is a picture of Gladstone when he was still a "stern and unbending" Tory. .

Gladstone "Victorian" Colossus

This blogger has looked before at British history in the decades Before World War I in a series of posts beginning here. Now we turn to consider a longer though overlapping era- the late Victorian Era That is roughly the last third or so of the nineteenth century particularly after the 1867 "Reform Act" inaugurated an era of working. Indeed there was a working class majority in British elections-an era that was to last till the 1990’s.

We will now examine the outstanding statesman and politician of this era-William Ewart Gladstone. He towered over every other political figure of hits era even the Likes of Salisbury who in some ways was more successful (he narrowly served longer in the premiership).

Indeed arguably we should know this era from the late 1860's onwards till around 1900as the Gladstone era. He was undoubatably the dominant figure in terms of the political agenda much more so than Queen Victoria herself who bitterly loathed his policies (though I’d say the “popular” view of her personal dislike is exaggerated)

Four times Prime Minister (1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886, 1892-1894)his ministries achieved some of the most important reforms of the era- expanding the Franchise(The right to vote) in the counties introducing the secret ballot ( a reform he himself was very sceptical off),replacing system of patronage which had been endemic in UK politics with a system for army and the civil service chiefly based on "objective" tests, the first land reform, the Disestablishment of the Church of Ireland-the first in the British isles to happen without replacement by another denomination , the first controls on alcohol (again one he himself was somewhat sceptical of) , raising the age of sexual consent to sixteen, the formal prohibition of same sex between men and many others. Moreover Gladstone was a colossal figure even when not holding the Premiership.

As Chancellor in the 1850's and 1860's he had been arguably the most influential Chancellor ever. IN his tenures as chancellor he set the foundations of the modern Treasury and having a massive impact on the Fiscal and trading Policy of the United Kingdom (then the world's foremost trading power).

Even when out of office his influence could be immense. In between his two ministries he famously led protests against the "Bulgarian atrocities" -that is the supposed tyranny of the British Backed Ottoman empire in Bulgaria. So strong was the authority this gave him at least among liberals that in 1880 he was able to sweep into the Premiership over the wishes of much of his own party leadership and the desperate efforts of the Queen herself.

Even when he failed his failures were truly impressive. The most notorious was of course his failure to achieve Home Rule for Ireland in his lifetime ( a cuase he embraced in his mid 70';s having been fairly hostile beforehand). Indeed it was not to be implemented until after World War I and in a form he would have been horrified by -he was fervenantly opposed to any exemption for Northern Irelands' passionately antiu HOme Rule Protestant and British nationalist majoirty. However it had the effect of deeply splitting the elite and part of the support of the Liberal party and reshaping British politics. This reviewer would also suggest that Gladstone had a huge pervasive influence on the politics of the period-for example in keeping down spending particularly but by no means exclusively on the military. Indeed particularly by the end of this era he was perhaps the supreme dividing force of British politics- the most polarizing figure in the country. Joseph Chamberlain stood against him on Home Rule and lost control of the same liberal party machinery he had built. AT the same time the level of hatred against Gladstone was very real even the Cecil’s opponents but quite friendly personally joked that “GOM” (for Grand Old Man one of his nicknames) stood for “God’s only mistake”.

Gladstone is undoubtedly one of the most important Prime Ministers. What perhaps sets him aside from most of the others (for example Churchill or Lloyd George) is the degree to which this is despite the lack of any enormous crisis that shook the foundations of the British state in his premiership that forms even a pale shadow of a major war. Yet he was such a dominant figure that he is properly regarded as holding a similar status.

Unsurprisingly these amazing achievements went with truly enormous abilities. He had an extremely acute intellect. His “hobbies” included writing very high level and original commentaries on Homer, Papal Infallibility and the national questions in Europe. However his intellect was probably matched by a handful of politicians –notably Salisbury (indeed when discussing reapportionment of constituencies Salisbury, Gladstone and Gladstone’s radical Dike left behind their relatively slower “allies” Hartington and Northbroke).

Where he was truly exceptional was in his sheer energy and force that was coupled to this intellect. Into his seventies he cut trees for a hobby. When assaulted at a similar age he chased down and caught the assailant. IN his youth he had often been highly awkward (his proposals of marriage to a series of often baffled young ladies are some of the funniest reading in history). Old age and success transformed his energy to charisma. His speeches were the most popular in the United Kingdom by some way- and the acoustics of the events (and the sheer size in this era before microphones) were such that this was not simply eloquence many must have gone just to gaze at the sheer force and actions of his personality. Perhaps most important of all was his will which gave him enormous powers of self discipline to the extent of beating himself to physically beat himself for sin. Again his power of determination seen in his tenth

Having given a bird’s eyes view of his massive political impact and striking personality we now turn to examine his ideological world view.

Here is a picture of Gladstone aged around 75 still only on his second of four ministries-already truly the "Grand Old Man"

Who were the Diehards?

The term “Diehard” is of used in histories or e of the interwar Conservative party. They tended treated as figures who often emerged to assail Tory leaders particularly Baldwin on issues as varied as India and trade union reform.

Definitions on the other hand are rather fewer. This (generally excellent) book of Stuart Ball's which enormously informs this post, for example suggests they were not really ideologically different from the Conservative party as a who but concerned with the “maintenance of standards” and “not intellectual rightwing” and “out of touch with the modern world”.

This does have some truth . As Ball rightly argues it’s very difficult to trace the Diehards back as a group to the origin of their name-those who rejected the acceptance of the Parliament act by the House of Lords preferring to “die” in the ditch ( have the House of Lord’s Conservative majority broken by hundreds of liberal peers who would then pass the act anyway).

Very few prominent interwar diehards had even been in the house of commons in that era- and diehards of that era were not necessarily “diehards” on issues such as government spending or India which split the interwar Conservative party.

Like most Conservative factions ( probably most factions in democratic parties) the edges of such a faction are rather blurry and it was in many ways a tendency rather htan a faction. Churchill after his switch to the conservative party rapidly displayed real “diehard” tendencies for example over India and over the creation of London transport (which he led the opposition to) but historians have been wary- perhaps in part because he was one of the very Conservative mp’s to basically be pro free trade. The diehards were the factional tendency (and like Baldwin proto- “one nationers” they were more a tendency than a faction ) that wanted to take stances further from the other main party-the Labour party. Thus in a certain sense what set aside a diehard –at least in many cases was not necessarily ideological differences with other Conservatives but either a belief the party should be willing to go to the stake for such principles. This was most notable on the issue of free trade as discussed below – where the party was united in principle. However it can also be seen on other issues-Ball has a point.

Nonetheless a fairly coherent ideological framework can be seen for most diehard policies of this era- that is the opposition to meant opposition to the ideology of the British Labour party. If the Labour party’s ideology was based on an ideology of equality of equality and cooperation “diehardism” was even more positively hostile to the form it took than the average Conservative as a whole. Or to put it another way the general Conservative “defence” of traditional institutions among the Diehards took the form of an aggressive offensive against any aspects of “Socialism”. Thus far from being a relic past they were based on a considered reaction to as opposed to ignoring of) the ideological currents of the era. One can see this is one compares their stance to the rest of the Conservative party across a wide range of areas.

On economic policy (broadly defined) they were more opposed to redistribution and the high spending and welfare expenditure that led to both enormous numbers of dole recipients (“scroungers” in the eyes of many diehards or at least including many such) and more fiercl.y opposed to of the taxes and deficits thius caused. They had a fuller opposition to any form of centralised control of industry with the aim of promoting some supposed common good, even more intense dislike of nationalization of the existing Conservative ( a “diehard” dominated Conservative party would not have nationalised manual revenues as Chamberlain did and "diehards" led by Churchill opposed the creation of London Transport)They re also more likely to be opposed to the powers and privileges of trade unions- it was “diehards” (in this case very much including Churchill) who took the hardest stand in the general strike for example.

On foreign and imperial policy they rejected the Labour’s internationalism anti-imperialism and neo-pacificism more than the average Conservative . It was Diehards by and large who objected to the creation of the Irish republic (in violation of the treaty under which the Irish Free state had been creation) and denounced the inaction of the Conservative government. It was diehards who led by Winston Churchill virulently opposed the concessions to self rule of the India act. And it was diehards who by the early 1930’s were the loudest voices for rearmament. Indeed Churchill’s earlier stress on the issue was seen possibly rightly as part of his embrace of diehard positions on a wide variety of issues in that period most of all but not exclusively India .

This changed of course in the late 1930’s when policy towards Germany became the central issue- an issue that cut across not just factional lines in the Conservative party but party lines as well. Indeed it led to the slightly bewildering spectacle of the diehard Duchess of Atholl fighting and losing a by-election on a platform of anti-appeasement backed even by members of the radical left -because she now saw "facism" (broadly defined) as an even greater threat than Communism.

Constitutionally there was arguably also a distinctive “diehard” stance though again it was a stance most opposed to the Labour party. In particular it was the right of the conservative party who were most keen on the constitutional innovation an elected house of Lords. This partly represented a belief both that a working constitution needed to be fully bi-cameral –that the Parliament act by allowing the House of Commons to ultimately get it’s way on virtually all issues had disrupted the constitution. But it can also be seen as a desire probably shrewd to provide a powerful new obstacle to socialist measures- particularly if the House of Lords was elected on a system (say a county basis or a property franchise) that would hurt the Labour party.

The hardest cause to see as the result of anti-Socialism (including a foreign policy that rejected the idea that force could be superseded by cooperation) was the diehard opposition to the abdication of Edward VIII over his marriage to a divorcee (again including Churchill). In many ways this represented a highly tradition view of kingship- the King’s sovereignty and status came from god or at least was a settled piece of property regardless of his personal behaviour . Baldwin, Chamberlain and Halifax on the other hand thought the monarchy had to at least to a certain degree model bourgeois and Christian values. The Labour party insofar as it was monarchist again preferred Baldwin’s model . This even incidentally also underlined the truth that the diehards were not necessarily particularly puritanical on sexual matters or even necessarily pious.

So ultimately the diehards did have a form of ideological coherence- in the aggressive rejection of Socialism. Just as the Labour party’s ideological core was fairly coherent- so were the diehards based on rejecting the assumptions about society domestic and international the Labour party’s was built
It’s also worth noting what the diehards were not.

As already suggested on Protectionism they were not necessarily different on principle from the party’s left – it would be hard to think of a leading Conservative moderate who was a free trader in this era . However their disillusionment with other aspects of Conservative support and greater belief in an aggressive foreign policy meant they tended to be for taking a more aggressive line.

They were not necessarily believers in lassire faire. Many of them were quite supportive of government action to support as opposed to transform existing institutions particularly business and agriculture-one reason why most of them were Protectionists- and many also expressed interest in agricultural subsidies or other forms. To be strongly opposed to the agenda of socialism including centralised planning was not the same as being even on economics a Gladstonian liberal.

They were not an electoral irrelevance even if one defines diehard strictly enough to exclude Churchill or the first Lord Halisham (probably the most important law officer) of this era. Perhaps the greatest proof of this was that this was the golden age of rightwing third parties (generally ) very brief. There were numerous “anti-waste” candidates in the early 1920’s who precipitated the massive spending cuts of that era. The Empire Free Trade candidates are more notorious-and tended to be on Protectionism where the difference between diehard and moderate was more tactical. But the last such candidate- in the famous by election of ST Georges was not really. Baldwin had essentially committed the conservative party to a fairly protectionist policy. Thus Rotheremere (the press baron who controlled the St georges campaign) ran instead mostly on the issue of India. This has often been condemned tactically and as a colossal failure. I’m rather dubious on the former and even the latter. Given the Tories had adopted a very radical policy protectionism it’d be absurd to have made that the main issue – thus te slogan . Even in the result the candidate got a vote equivlant to half the tory vote at the previous general election and 40% of the votes cast in the byelection. This was a very good result a third party suggesting the slogan “Gandhi is watching St Georges” could make a large minority of Conservative voters support a third party. Diehard themes when tried in general elections had a reasonable record-the 1931 election was the one fought on cuts in spending (including nominal cuts in benefits and public sector pay) and tariffs- and ended in the biggest conservative victory of the era. It’s very difficult to see how a more “diehard” or less “diehard” Conservative party would have done- but one should not assume “diehardism” simply meant electoral oblivion.

Unsurprisingly they were not an irrelevance in policy either . The industrial relations act of the mid 1920’s, and the moves to spending cuts, Protectionism and rearmament in the early 1930’s. Nor on the other hand is it true that the Conservative party of the inter-war era should be seen –ultimately Baldwin and Chamberlain were far removed from their stance and so diehard desires for a return to pre-war domestic spending, an uncompromising line on Germany in the 1920’s, an elected House of Lords or the repeal of the India act got nowhere.

I think the most unfair notion of Diehard’s is that were simply lost in the past. ON the contrary many of their policies were to be pursued by future conservative governments often many decades latter. This is most obvious in the case of trade union reform. In other areas their policies whatever their merits or demerits would become obsolete. Obviously after 1947 an attempt to hold on to India no longer had such relevance- and even the diehard successors’ in the Monday Club’s imperialism started to become irrelevant in the 1960’s. But the terms of the interwar debate are often forgotten- Baldwin and Irvin (later Halifax) argued on behalf of their Indian policy that these concession would prevent a move to actual independence. It’s dubious the diehard policy would have stopped it- could Indian indepe3nce have been stopped after World War 2? But it’s unquestionable that Baldwin and Irwin’s policy failed!

Here is a picture of a famous figure who a liberal imperialist,and quite a leftwing one before World War I but in this era on issues from India to rearmament to union reform to nationalisation was if not a diehard at least a fellow traveller-Winston Spencer Churchill.

Stanley Baldwin and the Rise of "one nation" Conservatism

We have thus seen that not only is it very dubious seeing Disreali as the founder of one nation conservatism but that it’s dubious whether there was a distinctive “moderate” faction or tradition in the party at all-the differences in the Conservative part before World War I being rather different in nature.

By “one nation” I mean not in a generic or nationalist sense but as a force and faction on the leftwing of the conservative party with an emphasis on such ideas as the desire to stand in the middle ground, an emphasis on the virtues of consensus and the use of government to help the poor.

I would see the inter-war era as being the one where such a distinctive tradition and faction can be seen as having developed some kind of coherence. One nation” even in such a relatively specific sense is probably best thought of as a tendency rather than necessarily a distinct faction.

It had strong roots in the coalition government of 1916-1922 particularly during it’s peace time era (with the "Llyod George liberals". This government made massive concessions from Conservative positions on a huge number of issues. Government spending and taxes stayed very high-much higher than the levels which had been regarded as dangerous by Conservatives before the war-it was not until the end of the coalition that large scale spending cuts in peacetime expenditure were engendered in large measure a response to electoral pressure and there was no increase in tariffs- the measure Conservatives had supported before World War I as a source of revenue. A large system of economic controls was retained (this was mostly dropped towards the end of the war under large scale electoral pressure) and there was actually some substantial measures to Social Reform. Not only was home rule conceded for Southern Ireland (with an Ulster exception) a compromise achieved during World War I but so was actual independence or “Free Statehood” for Southern Ireland. Tight new restrictions on the alcohol industry were introduced.

The “conservatism” of the coalition and the betrayal of supposedly widespread hopes for much greater social reform are often emphasised in the history but these were far from Conservative policies! These all represented big concessions for Conservative given their pre war ideology. Now of course this was in a coalition –but it was one where Conservatives actually had a narrow majority in Parliament after 1918. Even the partial acceptance of such policies represented at least a willingness to a accept leftwing status quo and even reform- if only as the painfull preferable to a more radical coalition. There was also a group (including the young Edward Wood latter a key moderate himself as Lord Irwin and Lord Halifax) of tory mp’s that made a great deal of their moderation and support for more lefitsh policies– for example sympathy for the control of alcohol and new welfare provisions.

It’s an irony that the second coalition of this period the “national” government of the 1930’s (very much a coalition in more htan a nominal sense at least before 1935) was run by figures like Baldwin who had loathed the first one- given the remarkable similarities between the two (though the National one arguably had a less leftwing record).

Baldwin was indeed one of the figures who brought the coalition down in 1922. He was to become tory leader from 1923-1937, holding the premiership from 1922-1923, 1924-1929 and 1935-1937. From 1931 to 1935 he held cabinet office (lord President0 and combined this with being the leader of a party that held a majority-indeed the largest of any party in the twentieth century! This represented enormous electoral dominance for the Conservative party-Baldwin was in the interwar era the dominant figure of the dominant party. Baldwin is often associated rather simplistically with the policy of “appeasement” and this has cast something of a cloud over the seminal role of his leadership- for a start it alienated a figures who were to become the most successful post war “one nation” tory Harold Macmillan . Though he certainly had his faults (a certain lethargy when he did not consider a great clash of principle was at stake) he combined great personal integrity with shrewd political instincts. Many of the leading one nation Conservatives of the post war era-for example Anthony Eden and “RAB” Butler were massively inspired by him and regarded themselves in the in interwar era as very much “Baldwin men”. Indeed Baldwin was to have continuous clashes with leading Conservatives who wanted to take a “harder line” further removed from Labour party.

IT is thus worth examining what was distinctive in Baldwin’s positions and that of other moderates in this era and to what degree they can be seen as prefiguring post wawr "one nation" Conservatism.

One was what might be called electoralism-the belief that the Conservatives could only win generally on a moderate version of their policies and needed to win by moving to the center. Now it’s unclear how much this was true of Baldwin (though he tended to believe that only if an election had been won on a new policy could it be introduced) and it’s scarcely a unique feature of the twentiet century Conservative party. However it does seem to have been unusually strong in this era – even the first leader Andrew Bonar Law was convinced the post war era would see very formidable socialism –one reason why he long supported an alliance with Llyod George A classic case was Protectionism in the 1929-1930 era . Then the leadership resisted strongly efforts to run on it despite enormous pressure in the “Empire Free Trade” candidates who actually beat official conservative candidates in some by-elections though they did more or less conceded . And yet very few Tories were anything but strongly protectionist- and the few who were not (notably Salisbury and Churchill) were not particularly moderate on other issues.
Un surprinsgly those who argued the Tories needed to moderate to win and probably those who were most concerned with the tory party winning at all costs tended to be on Baldwin’s side in internal struggles.

In fact one reason why the biggest challenge to Baldwin’s leadership was in the 1929-1931 period was that a disproportionate number of moderate pro Baldwin mp’s represented marginal seats- so anti-Baldwin “diehards” were stronger in the 1929-1931 era. It’s probably unnecessary to underline the continuity with post war one nation Conservatims- indeed the belief that electoral victory was imperative and won ground could arguably be said to be its most definitive belief.

This was closely linked to linked strategies of “killing Socialism with kindness” and “social reform”. This did not just take the form of concern for the poor which is scarcely the preserve of any part of the tory party or political spectrum. This was a belief in positive (that is coercive and t) government action to help the interest of the poor and for that matter the non poor-for example by expanding old age pensions and regulating the health insurance market to make it harder to drop applicants for insurance-both policies of the tory party of this era.

Neville Chamberlain was perhaps the most important supporter and advocate of such policies n the Tory Party in this era Innded even while Prime Minister he had a series of importatn measures understandably neglected by historians. Chamberlain was in part motivated by a desire to stem the tide of Socialism which he concluded nearly . But he sincerely believed in extensive social reform as did other party moderates such as Lord Halifax. The belief in postive welfare and regulatory programmes to benefit the poor was again to be a distinctive aspect of post-war “one nation” Conservatism from the expansions of the NHS by the Tories in the 1950’s to Michael Heseltine’s attempts to set up zones to revive the inner cities in the 1980’s and beyond. At the same time one nation conservatives both in the inter-war and post war era had very limited belief in redistribunary motivated welfare-that is arguments for and policies that about redistricting income rather than the subtly but importantly different “alleviating the condition of the people”. Again this was to continue after World War II (though arguably in the inter-war era Conservatives placed more emphasis on the “contributory principle”).

A third emphasis was on what might be called flexibility on Constitutional and Imperialist matters. This was partly based on a rejection of a clear cut British Imperalist Nationalism (not the same as embracing a version of internationalism like the Labour party). Partly it was based on drawing a particular lesson from the failure to keep most of Ireland in the Union-that the parties needed to prevent disaster to keep a consensus on matters of imperial issues (and to some degree foreign policy as a whole- it was a factor in moving cautiously on reanarment as well). ]

In the Baldwin era perhaps the most important such issue was India-which strained party unity a great deal with many years of conflict untill the passage of the India act in 1935. Yet Baldwin was able to defend unprecedented moves towards self government and the weaking of British control of India and administer that policy- a policy moreover that was t a large degree the work of another Conservative Lord Irwin latter Lord Halifax (describe) . The ability to pass the policy owed a lot loyalty to party leadership-in fact it’d almost certainaly have been a lot easier for Baldwin to take a policy on this position the “diehard” position was probably actually more popular in the conservative party and possibly the country. But the very willingness to take such risks represented a principled position . IN the post-war era the “one nation” tradition was to be identified with a greater willingness to reduce and end the British empire and (more ambiguously) a greater sympathy for the European Union and other transnational organisations. In the willingness to moderate the more straightforward nationalism of Conservatives before World War I this can very easily be seen as reflecting the tradition of Baldwin and his allies over the India bill. IN that can be seen the distinct but recognisable ancestry of Margaret Thatcher’s gibe that too often a better term would be "no nation Conservatives".

This obsession with consensus on imperial and constitutional matters can be seen as part of a wider preoccupation with concord in politics including economics a desire not to “divide” the nation. For example Baldwin was very wary of aggressive moves away from “socialist” economics for example tough trade union reform. After the 1929 election a group of pro Baldwin young mp’s including hte young Anthony Eden blamed the industrial relations act of the previous goverment for the Conservative loss of a majority-probably with some justice. Again a wariness about polarising economic policies (though not necessarily so much rof estrictions of trade union power0 was to be a defining feature of post war Conservativism . Indeed the popularity of the term “one nation” probably reflects this very use!

Finally Baldwin himself was also keen on one nation in another sense- he went out of his way to be respectful to the Labour party to treat them as a legitimate part of the political system. Indeed the sacrifices he made to keep the tiny “national labour” party fraction in the coalition in the 1930’s are remarkable- after all McDonald the leader of a party splinter with 14 mp’s was Prime Minster while Baldwin was not with his over 500 (admittedly this may partly have represented a lack of deep personal interest in the premiership). . McDonald as “national Labour” had more control of the government’s agenda not least in blocking moves to the right as supporting international disarmament than is generally realised.

I think this kind of bi-partisanship is dubiously part of “one nation toryism” – Michael Heseltine for example was a famously partisan orator. Even in the inter-war era another moderate model is available- probably the second most important figure Neville chamberlain. The great architect of social reform was one of the most partisan figures of the age. At one poiont Baldwin suggested to him he stop treating the Labour party like dirt to his sisters he stated the problemwas “intellectually..“ they mostly were! . Understandly he was not much loved by the Labour party in return.

So there was a distinctive moderate tradition which was extremely important and arguably dominated the Conservative party in this era. It’s important to realize this did not mean the likes of Chamberlain and Baldwin merely supported a more moderate version of Labour party ideology- they had very little time for the core ideas of the Labour party whether economic equality , collective ownership or radical internationalism. At the same time they had enormous support the conseration of existing institutions values from the Church of England to property. This meant there were sharp differences with the Labour party whether on defence spending or nationalisation of privately owned companies . Harold Macmillan as a minor tory mp in this era ( when he was much more leftwing than he was as Prime Minister) is that rare case an exception that proves the rule. He in his “third way” did argue for comprehensive government planning of the economy- but was regarded as a marginal figure on the extreme left of the conservative party not a mainstream moderate like Eden or Halifax.

However there were still a broad range of issues where they took a genuine moderate stance.It’s perhaps no coincidence that the strands of moderation identified above can also be seen as rooted in an ideology of defence.

Having discussed the origin of one nation supporters in the broadly moderate faction and tendencies of the pre war Conservative party it remains only to look at the other side- the Diehards.
The picture of course is appropriately of Stanley Baldwin.

The myth of Benjaman Disreali and "one nation" Conservatism

What are the origins of a one nation “ tradition in the Conservative party-t. The title is of course very vague and used a great deal by figures across the Conservative party political spectrum. However when used with some precision as a tradition of the (arguably the tradition of the ) leftwing of the Conservative party. It could broadly defined as a tradition in the Conservative party that emphasises the use of government to improve social welfare a general belief in compromise and harmony for it’s own sake in politics including and seeking to be overall closer to leftwing opposition than the average member of the Conservative party as a whole and perhaps a relative openness to other political parties and social outsiders . Even today a substantial number of Tory mp’s s identify somewhat with the nominature of this tradition and probably at least a considerable amount with the description.

This tradition is often traced back to Benjamin Disraeli the great late nineteenth century leader of the Conservative party who popularised the slogan ) and is often seen as the originator of a “one nation” tradition to the degree that the mere mention of his name in speeches was at least at one point seen as a sign of identification with the by the “leftwing” of the Conservative party. Disreali is a fascinating and often much misunderstood figure a socially dubious poet who managed to become one of the top powrs in the land, a Jew who was baptised in adolescent who became a Prime Minster in the nineteenth century -arguably a bigger cross over of social barriers than any 20th century prime minster). IN that sense he does represent an idea of “one nation”.

However it is difficult to see how the normal idea of one nation Conservatism as described above has much to do with him . Many of Disraeli’s issues as party leader were related to the call “church in danger” and the linked strong Tory support of Anglican establishment and traditional “constitutional” elements such as the purchasing of commissions in the army . Indeed his famous “Young England” in his youth owed more to that and a certain sentimentality for the middle ages than anything else. While many one nation Tories have been passionate about such issues ( for example Stanley Baldwin who is partly the subject of a future post) it’s hard to see it as specific to that tradition.

Disraeli’ was by the standards of his era highly partisan though it’s dubious whether either should be seen as being contradictory to the one nation tradition.
Three actual policies of Disraeli are often taken as signs of some one nation toy tradition. Firstly Disraeli’s government extended the franchise, secondly his stands on trade issues and thirdly his governments contribution to “social reform” particularly union reform.

All three are extremely dubious. On the franchise Disraeli’s ministry passed the Second Great Reform Act which extended it by an enormous amount the franchise- for example making it have a majority working class . It’s also dubious whether any “one nation” tradition in the twentieth and twenty first century Conservative party can really be identified with franchise extension-in an era where the franchise was no longer an issue. If anything the transfer of powers to non elected bodies such as the European court of justice has been more popular. And if one nation conservatism has been anything it’s not been populist. Even more to the point the evidence is Disreali had no particular desire to massively extended the franchise and was keen just to pass a bill (partly to give his government an achievement and partly to let the Tories write the terms of the redrawing of parliamentary boundaries) -and that the bill was much more radical in effect than intention- it enfranchised most of it’s voters on a technicality which was not realized at the time.

On protection Disraeli has been invoked as one national both as the opponent of “dogmatic” free marketers by bringing down Robert Peel and for his embrace of free trade. It’s hard to see how any particular position on trade reflects a “one nation” perspective. Disraeli’s position on trade was less inconsistent than he is sometimes portrayed. It could be said to be fairly free trade but with an emphasis on obeying election promises, and a desire to help agricultural interests. None of this could be said to have be particularly part of one nation Toryism.

Disraeli’s government contribution to social reform while real has been grossly exaggerated-it was considerably less extensive than Gladstone (and arguably less important than the reforms passed under Disraeli’s Bete noir Peel).- During these reforms Disraeli brought in a new emphasis on local option-that is if ratepayers didn’t want to do something they would not have to do so. The enormously important industrial relations act was a bi-partisan act with as much support among liberals as Conservatives- and the big divide in the Conservative party has never really been on union regulation.

So the argument for Disraeli being a “one nation” Tory is rather tenuous. There would be more grounds to see him a proto-Thatcherite though that would also be rather anachronistic. Disreali presided over and played a part in adding new cries to the Tory election appeal. The older tory cries of the “constitution” and “church in danger” .It was under Disraeli the Tories began attacking the liberals seriously for legislations that meddled with liberties and traditional rights-notably that of the drink trade- in a sense the rather modest beginning of a “small government” appeal. It was under Disraeli that the Tories began to push also nationalist themes such as the empire and the liberals as unpatriotic opponents of troops. As i said to call this the beginning of Thatcherism is anachronistic but it’s hard to see how if there is a distinctive one nation tradition opposed or moderating Thatcherism that it owes much to Disraeli-whatever his role in the use of it as a name.

This is not the only problem. As already mentioned it’s hard to see the divisions in the Conservative party before World War I as being of that nature (though Arthur Balfour did refer to protectionists as the “left” Of the party) I would place the origins of the “one nation” tradition as normally defined in the interwar era-and it is to this that we will now return.

The interwar era and the "old politics"

So the politics of class and labour do a great deal to explain why ordinary people chose the sides in the political struggles of the interwar United Kingdom between Labour and Conservatives. However Politics associated with the workplace did not explain all the voting patterns of this era. IN many ways the cleavages that existed in this period were a continuation of those that had existed before World War II-. Before World War II a large amount of voting could be explained by the clash of those for and against the traditional constitutional order of the United Kingdom.

Socially the former and Conservative party voters tended to be Anglican in England and Wales ,Church of Scotland in Scotland and Protestant in Ireland and to a latter degree the rest of the UK (particularly areas with large Catholic populations such as Lancashire and Glasgow). The latter voted for the liberals (in Ireland their Irish nationalist allies) and tended to gain the support of Nonconformists of all sorts in Great Britain and Catholics throughout the Kingdom . These divisions also were linked to important divisions on socio-cultural issues such as drink and religious education which follows similar though not identical lines ( Tories, Anglicans and Catholics liked alcohol and government funding of denominational schools Liberals and nonconformists generally did not).

In the interwar era these divisions faded in importance. This was a for a number of reasons. However it’d be fair to say the Labour party was more prohibitionist and got more support from Nonconformists even allowing for class- they were the party of bigger government and nonconformists after all were less likely to have been from a Tory tradition- they could effectively choose Labour rather than abandoning the party of their forefathers. .Such effects were quite weak though. Areas like Pudsey ( a rural/ suburban areas needs Leeds) moved from liberal to Tory as class conflict replaced religious. Some historians argue there was a new development- the pious were more likely to vote conservative allowing for denomination- perhaps not surprisingly if it was a preference for the politics of defence of institutions over the politics of transformation of society-though this effect if true was weak.

The Catholic, Protestant split was more powerful than any other religious cleavage tdespite the low profile of the old constitutional issues. Catholic areas were heavily Labour, Protestant areas near large concentrations of Catholic became heavily Conservative This was at it most intense among Protestants in Ulster (the Labour party was not organised in Ulster) . Even in mainland Great Britain it remained a strong cleavage. As late as the 1950’s in greater Glasgow middle class Catholics voted Labour and working class Protestants Conservative. Such appeals could survive a landslide. In the Tories terrible result in 1945 the two large cities that were most Conservative were Liverpool and Glasgow the two large cities where the “orange” ) vote was strongest. It’s worth noting Sectarian cleavages were not generally driven by of church hierarchies –Catholic clergy in this era had strong Conservative sympathies possibly more than Anglican clergy who had already started moving leftwards politically. Ironically it was in the post war era even as the politics of the instuitional catholic church moved leftwards that catholic identifiers were to vote increasingly Conservative.

The religious cleavages could have strange influences on the ideology of party members which went uneasily with the overall ideology of the parties . So in the Spanish civil war one reason for the relatively low level of outright Conservative support for the Nationalists ( compared to Continental and Latin American Conservatives) was anti-Catholicism. Similarly in the most Catholic party of Liverpool the local Labour party sympathised with Franco’s side . Indeed the religious cleavages could s interact peculiarly with each other- In the 1950’s one survey of attendees of a nonconformist church in Liverpool found that middle class members voted liberal and Lab our working class Conservatives.

In a sense areas with a large Catholic minority had a different electoral basis for politics than the rest of the country-adding a geographic element to politics. This could also be seen in other areas where it is difficult to see that as the reason. In particular Birmingham was remarkable Conservative with them being dominant and competitive even in very working class areas in the city central. Birmingham had a lot of small employers and industries hurt by free trade. It’s hard to believe this did not represent the powerful local political machine, the legacy of Joseph Chamberlain and the presence of the Conservative titan Neville Chamberlain. It’s worth noting that the Labour swing was unusually strong in Birmingham in 1945 the election that ended this political era- suggesting both that the Chamberlain brand might have been tarnished and that “localism” politics based on a particular popular or effective local political figures or party was being pushed aside by class politics.

It should also be noted that there were other issues that’ so hard to put together with the new era of class politics. These included the empire (though the historic links of say Liverpool to the empire may have contributed to it’s Conservatism). However what’s noticeable is how many issues can be seen as fitting in well with a class cleavage. . Though anti-communism and anti-Sovietism was a broad sentiment it would naturally scare more those outside the “self conscious working class system” who opposed nationalization and saw the capitalist system in more positive terms. It’s worth noting the election most fought on communism was the 1924 election where under that banner Conservatives made massive gains from the liberals- nearly all voters outside organised labour ( the Labour vote actually rose).

But there were also divisions within the two parties. And it is to the divisions in one of these parties-the Conservative we now turn.

This is a picture of a figure whose contribution to politics in this era dealt a great deal with the “old” issues divisions James Craig 1st viscount Creigan first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland one of the leading Conservative and Unionists of this era.